



1996

Self Incrimination

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview>



Part of the [Constitutional Law Commons](#), and the [Courts Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

(1996) "Self Incrimination," *Touro Law Review*: Vol. 12 : No. 3 , Article 64.

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/64>

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

THIRD DEPARTMENT

Curry v. Rogers

Curry v. Hunt

(decided December 22, 1994)¹⁰⁵

Respondents, supervisors of different towns in Hamilton County who refused to sign a waiver of immunity before testifying before a grand jury, claimed their right to protection from self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution¹⁰⁶ was violated by article I, section 6, of the New York State Constitution.¹⁰⁷ Article I, section 6 requires that any public officer who refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution be disqualified from holding office.¹⁰⁸ The Appellate Division, Third Department, held that New York State Constitution (article I, section 6) could not require public officers to execute waivers of immunity under penalty of removal from office because such action would be a direct violation of the respondent's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.¹⁰⁹

Respondents, Henry L. Rogers and Allen L. Hunt, supervisors of the Towns of Arietta and Wells respectively, both in Hamilton

105. 210 A.D.2d 784, 620 N.Y.S.2d 521 (3d Dep't 1994).

106. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This section provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall [anyone] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" *Id.*

107. *Rogers*, 210 A.D.2d at 785, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 522. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in relevant part:

[A]ny public officer who, upon being called before a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his present office or of any public office held by him within five years prior to such grand jury call to testify, or the performance of his official duties in any such present or prior offices, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters before such grand jury, and shall be removed from his present office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his present office at the suit of the attorney-general.

Id.

108. *Rogers*, 210 A.D.2d at 785, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 522.

109. *Id.* at 786, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 523.

County, were summoned to appear before a grand jury for the investigation of "possible misconduct, nonfeasance or neglect in office by respondents and other public servants" pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 190.55.¹¹⁰

Respondents appeared before the grand jury and were ready to testify, but when asked by petitioner to execute waivers of immunity, both respondents refused to do so.¹¹¹ Consequently, petitioner initiated this proceeding to have both respondents removed from public office pursuant to New York State Constitution, article I, section 6, which provides for the disqualification of any public official who refuses to sign a waiver of immunity.¹¹²

Respondents argued that article I, section 6 is a violation of their constitutional right against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.¹¹³ The court, after a brief discussion, ruled in favor of respondents and dismissed the petitioner's claim.¹¹⁴ In doing so, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court case of *Gardner v. Broderick*¹¹⁵ and the Appellate Division, Third Department case of *Mountain v. City of Schenectady*.¹¹⁶

The facts in the *Gardner* and *Mountain* cases presented similar circumstances. In both cases, the public official, a police officer, was discharged from his position because of his refusal to execute a waiver of immunity before testifying before a grand jury.¹¹⁷

110. *Id.* at 785, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 522; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.55 (McKinney 1993). This section provides in pertinent part: "A grand jury may hear and examine evidence concerning the alleged commission of any offense prosecutable in the courts of the county and concerning any misconduct, nonfeasance or neglect in public office by a public servant, whether criminal or otherwise." *Id.*

111. *Rogers*, 210 A.D.2d at 785, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 522.

112. *Id.*

113. *Id.*

114. *Id.*

115. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).

116. 100 A.D.2d 718, 474 N.Y.S.2d 612 (3d Dep't 1984).

117. *Gardner*, 392 U.S. at 274-75; *Mountain*, 100 A.D.2d at 718, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 613. In *Gardner*, appellant, a police officer of the City of New York, was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury which was investigating

The *Mountain* court distinguished between the police officer's refusal to sign a waiver of immunity and refusal to answer questions "specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of his official duties."¹¹⁸ The court noted that had the police officer refused to do the latter of the two, the privilege against self-incrimination would not have been a bar to the officer's discharge.¹¹⁹ However, the facts indicated that the police officer was essentially being asked to either surrender his Fifth Amendment constitutional right or lose his job.¹²⁰ Citing *Gardner*, the court held that this sort of practice would not be tolerated.¹²¹

In *Gardner*, the Court noted that the police officer was not discharged from his duties for failure to testify before the grand jury about his official duties, but for a refusal to waive his constitutional right to the privilege against self-incrimination.¹²² The Court further stated that had the purpose of the questions of the police officer been merely to secure an accounting of his performance of his public trust, there would have been no need to have the police officer sign a waiver of immunity.¹²³ It was clear, however, that the purpose was an attempt to prosecute the officer.¹²⁴ Subsequently, the Court held that compelling the officer to waive his privilege against self-incrimination, when refusal would have resulted in the loss of his job, could not be

alleged bribery and corruption of the city police officers. 392 U.S. at 274-75. The appellant appeared before the grand jury and was subsequently ordered to sign a waiver of immunity or lose his job. *Id.* He refused to sign the waiver and, as a result, was discharged after an administrative hearing was held on the issue. *Id.* In *Mountain*, petitioner, a police officer of the City of Schenectady, was indicted on counts of rape and sodomy and on two counts of official misconduct. 100 A.D.2d at 718, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 613. Petitioner appeared before a grand jury, but refused to sign a waiver of immunity. *Id.* Subsequently, he was discharged from his official duties. *Id.*

118. *Mountain*, 100 A.D.2d at 719, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 614-15.

119. *Id.*

120. *Id.* See *supra* note 117.

121. *Mountain*, 100 A.D.2d at 719, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 614-15.

122. 392 U.S. at 278.

123. *Id.* at 279.

124. *Id.*

considered constitutional.¹²⁵ Thus, the *Gardner* Court stated that “the provision of the New York City Charter pursuant to which petitioner was dismissed cannot stand.”¹²⁶

In summary, both the federal and New York law, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court case of *Gardner* and the New York cases of *Curry* and *Mountain*, are in accord in holding that to compel public officials to sign a waiver of immunity is to unlawfully disregard the public official’s constitutional right to the privilege against self-incrimination.¹²⁷

125. *Id.*

126. *Id.*

127. N.Y. CONST. amend. V.