Playing the Game of International Law

Authors

Uri Weiss
Joseph Agassi

Abstract

In the realist game of international negotiations, each state attempts to promote their interest regardless of international law. Thus, it is negotiations in the shadow of the sword, i.e., a negotiation in which each side knows that if the parties will not achieve an agreement, the alternative may be a war, and thus the bargaining position of each party is a function of their capacities in a case of war. Negotiation in the shadow of international law is an alternative to it: in this alternative the parties negotiate according to their international legal rights. It reduces injustice and incentive to armament and to terror. It thus promotes peace. A state can choose unilaterally to play the game of negotiations in accord with international law by merely respecting the rights of one’s neighbours regardless to their waving swords, and by this have much more peace and generate incentives against terror and armament. This efficiently brings much more security and peace. A policy of respecting international law, combined with conditional generosity, is more efficient. The wish for peace should make a country encourage its neighbours to avoid armament. The best way to do so is to adopt a policy of unilateral respect for international law and conditional generosity towards one’s neighbours. The international community should enforce, or at least encourage, negotiations in accord with international law.

Recommended Citation

Weiss, Uri and Agassi, Joseph (2022) "Playing the Game of International Law," Touro Law Review: Vol. 38: No. 3, Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/7